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MAKING KIDS TAKE THEIR MEDICINE: THE
PRIVACY AND DUE PROCESS RIGHTS OF DE
FACTO COMPETENT MINORS
Jan C. Costello*
A LAW SCHOOL EXAM QUESTION'
Scene #1: A teenage girl sits and weeps in a mental health pro-
fessional's office. "I can't stop crying. I'm so depressed. How about
some of that Prozac or something?" The kindly mental health pro-
fessional says, "Sorry, I can't prescribe medication for you without
your parent's consent." The teenage girl says, "But they let me get
an abortion without parental consent. If I can consent to abortion,
why not to medication?"
Scene #2: Adolescent ward of psychiatric hospital. Two teen-
agers, male and female, are sitting in a day room watching television.
A nurse appears with a tray of medications. The teenage boy says, "I
don't want to take that stuff." The nurse says, "You don't have the
right to refuse; you're a minor." The teenage girl says, "I wanted to
have an abortion, but my parents said no. I went to juvenile court,
and the judge said I was competent to make my own decision about
abortion. I could have it if I wanted or refuse to have it; it was up to
me."
The teenage boy asks eagerly, "Do I get to tell a judge that I
don't want the meds?"
DISCUSS. (For extra credit, is there any difference if each
scene is based in California?)
A STUDENT'S EXAM ANSWER
These scenes present two aspects of the same issue: whether de
* Professor of Law, Loyola Law School, Los Angeles.
1. Or perhaps a screenplay in progress. For an earlier attempt to discuss a
mental disability law issue in screenplay form, see Jan C. Costello, L.A. Law
School, 29 LoY. L.A. L. REv. 1585 (1996) (advising mental health professionals
of obligation and ability to disclose confidential communications).
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facto competent or "mature" minors have the right to give or with-
hold consent to psychotropie medication. The scenes dramatically
illustrate an existing confusion in the law: although minors have well-
established rights in the context of abortion, it is unclear to what ex-
tent such rights are applicable to medication decisions in the context
of mental health care.
U.S. Supreme Court Abortion Cases-Privacy Rights and the De
Facto Competent Minor
The United States Supreme Court has recognized in abortion
cases that minors, like adults, have a constitutionally protected pri-
vacy right.' That right includes the right to protect bodily integrity
and to make health care decisions, especially, but not limited to,
those involving reproduction.4 Of course, a minor's privacy rights are
not coextensive with the rights of adults.5 Traditionally, at common
law and under state statutes a parent or adult legal guardian has ex-
ercised this privacy right on behalf of the minor. But at least in the
abortion context, a minor's privacy right is so strong that despite such
traditional authority,6 parental control over the abortion decision
2. "Psychotropic" refers to medication prescribed for treatment of thought
or mood disorders and includes antipsychotics, antidepressants, and antimanic
agents. See ROBERT J. WALDINGER, FUNDAMENTALS OF PSYCHIATRY 397
(1986).
3. See Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 154 (1973) (holding that the right of pri-
vacy includes the right to make decisions about abortion); Griswold v. Connecti-
cut, 381 U.S. 479, 485-86 (1965) (holding that the right of privacy includes birth
control decision). For an excellent discussion of how these early cases formed
the basis for substantive due process arguments that courts applied in mental dis-
ability cases, see BRUCE J. WINICK, THE RIGHT TO REFUSE MENTAL HEALTH
TREATMENT 189-222 (1997), and MICHAEL L. PERLIN, MENTAL DISABILITY
LAw: CIVIL AND CRIMINAL § 5.07 (1989).
4. See Roe, 410 U.S. at 152.
5. In virtually all cases involving children's constitutional rights-from First
Amendment to privacy-the Court has made this distinction. In some cases "not
co-extensive" may translate into "not even close to" having the weight and scope
of the adult's right. See, e.g., Bethel Sch. Dist. v. Fraser, 478 U.S. 675, 682 (1986)
(discussing regulation of speech in school); New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325,
341 (1985) (holding that standard for in-school search is less than probable
cause); Ginsberg v. New York, 390 U.S. 629, 637 (1968) (upholding a New York
statute that deems materials obscene for minors but not for adults). In the abor-
tion cases, however, a minor's right most closely approaches the adult's right so
that although the state still may regulate the minor to a greater extent than it
could an adult, the state must provide an opportunity for the de facto competent
minor to exercise her own privacy right.
6. See generally Jan C. Costello, "If I Can Say Yes, Why Can't I Say No?"
Adolescents At Risk and the Right to Give or Withhold Consent to Health Care, in
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cannot be absolute. In Planned Parenthood v. Danforth 9the Su-
preme Court held that a state could not give the parent an absolute
veto power over a minor's abortion decision.8 Moreover, Bellotti v.
Baird laid down the principle that a competent minor must have an
opportunity to demonstrate her competence to make the decision
herself.'° If a neutral decision-maker finds that she is competent, the
decision is her own. If she is not found competent, the neutral deci-
sion-maker can decide whether the abortion is in her best interest."
Thus, courts since Bellotti have recognized the concept of a de
facto competent minor. The Supreme Court has acknowledged that,
despite the traditional legal presumption that minors in general are
incompetent to make health care decisions, individual minors in fact
possess such competence. 3 And in the context of abortion, such a de
facto competent minor must be given an opportunity to demonstrate
her competence. 4 Preventing a legally competent minor from mak-
ing the abortion decision herself would violate her privacy right.
Therefore, to save the constitutionality of parental consent and pa-
rental notice statutes, the Supreme Court has consistently required a
"judicial bypass"-a hearing at which a minor who believes she is
competent may prove such competence before a neutral decision-
maker.
Since minors, unlike adults, are presumed incompetent, the mi-
nor has the burden of proving that she is capable of making the abor-
CHILD, PARENT AND STATE: LAW AND PoLIcY READER 490, 491 (S. Randall
Humm et al. eds., 1994) (stating that at common law minors could not make valid
contracts with health care providers and could not give valid consent to treat-
ment); Jennifer L. Rosato, The Ultimate Test of Autonomy: Should Minors Have
A Right to Make Decisions Regarding Life-Sustaining Treatment?, 49 RUTGERS
L. REv. 1, 17-25 (1996) (discussing that at common law a minor had no right to
refuse or consent to medical treatment); Walter Wadlington, Medical Decision
Making for and by Children: Tensions Between Parent, State, and Child, 1994 U.
ILL. L. REv. 311,314-18 (1994) (illustrating how courts in the first half of the cen-
tury refused to acknowledge children's privacy rights).
7. 428 U.S. 52 (1976).
8. See id. at 74.
9. 443 U.S. 622 (1979).
10. See id. at 643.
11. See id.
12. See id. at 644.
13. See id. at 643-44 & n.23.
14. See id. at 643-44.
15. See Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 899 (1992); Hodgson v.
Minnesota, 497 U.S. 417,448-49 (1990); Akron v. Akron Ctr. for Reprod. Health,
Inc., 462 U.S. 416, 439-40 (1983); Bellotti, 443 U.S. at 643-44. But see H.L. v.
Matheson, 450 U.S. 398, 409 (1981) (upholding constitutionality of parental no-
tice statute for incompetent minors).
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tion decision. The presumption of incompetence does not itself pres-
ent a constitutional problem." The state traditionally has a strong
"parens patriae" interest in looking after the health and welfare of
minors, protecting them against bad decisions grounded in immatur-
ity. This interest justifies restrictions on the decisions of a minor
who actually is incompetent, as most minors are presumed to be.
However, once the minor has proven her competence, the state no
longer has a parens patriae basis to deny her the power to make her
own decision. A judicial bypass that evaluates each minor's individ-
ual competence thus satisfies the state's interest in protecting incom-
petent minors." If a minor is found incompetent, the state's parens
patriae interest continues and is then exercised through a decision by
the judge or hearing officer regarding the minor's best interests.
Conversely, if the minor is found competent, the state has no further
interest in her decision.
This body of case law chiefly involves constitutional challenges
to parental consent or notice statutes. Accordingly, most of these
cases involve a minor seeking a judicial determination of competency
so that she can consent to an abortion without notice to her parents
or despite their disapproval. Occasionally, however, a minor wants to
be declared competent so that she may refuse an abortion. The same
principle applies to both situations since a competent person has the
right both to refuse or consent to an abortion."
Applying These Principles to the Medication Decision
These two exam hypotheticals raise an interesting question: why
do these principles seem confined to the field of abortion law? Why
have they not been applied in the context of mental health law?
Suppose a judge found a minor to be competent to consent to an
abortion on a Wednesday. The abortion was performed on Thurs-
day. On the following Monday, the minor fell into a deep depression
and then sought mental health treatment. Does it make sense that
she cannot consent to medication for her depression because as a mi-
16. See Matheson, 450 U.S. at 405-07.
17. See Bellotti, 443 U.S. at 635.
1& See id- at 643.
19. The Supreme Court has recognized the logical corollary of the informed
consent doctrine: a patient has the right not to consent, that is, to refuse treat-
ment. See, e.g., Cruzan v. Director, Mo. Dep't of Health, 497 U.S. 261, 270
(1990); see also In re Smith, 295 A.2d 238 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1972) (holding that
a parent cannot compel a minor to submit to an abortion); WINICK, supra note 3,
at 1-2.
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nor she is presumed incompetent? If she has been found competent
to make one important health care decision, what is the basis for the
state's parens patriae interest in preventing her from consenting to
medication? Similarly, if the minor was found competent on
Wednesday to refuse an abortion-against her parents' wishes-why
can a mental health professional medicate her the very next day
against her wishes merely because her parents have given consent?
Perhaps because the abortion case law has developed in such a
specialized way, advocates for children with mental disabilities have
seldom thought to apply it in a mental health contextf The older
mental health cases that sought due process rights for minors were
often brought on basic equal protection grounds. The argument was
that because adults have certain rights before being involuntarily
hospitalized and treated, a minor should have similar rights. When
the courts rejected those arguments, minors were frequently left
without many rights at all. Moreover, the older due process cases
like Parham v. J.R' and In re Roger S.2 focused on the right to a
hearing before hospital admission to determine whether a minor sat-
isfied the criteria for commitment. Those cases did not address the
issue of a minor's competence to give or withhold consent to medica-
tion.' Cases addressing an adult's right to refuse treatment at least
attempted to separate the question of meeting criteria for commit-
ment from being incompetent to make treatment decisions,24 but the
20. A noteworthy exception is Richard E. Redding, Children's Competence to
Provide Informed Consent for Mental Health Treatment, 50 WASH. & LEE L.
REv. 695, 719 (1993) ("If bypass procedures are provided to minors in the abor-
tion context because of the privacy interests and potential harm involved, judicial
review and bypass should also be available in the mental health context."). See
also Parham v. J.R., 442 U.S. 584, 631 (1979) (Brennan, J., concurring in part and
dissenting in part) (arguing that "[tihe right [of a minor] to be free from wrongful
incarceration, physical intrusion, and stigmatization has significance for the indi-
vidual surely as great as the right to an abortion"); Costello, supra note 6, at 492.
21. 442 U.S. 584 (1979).
22. 19 Cal. 3d 921,569 P.2d 1286, 141 Cal. Rptr. 298 (1977).
23. Contributor to this Symposium, James W. Ellis, thinks that the focus of
due process for minors admissions proceedings still should be the appropriate-
ness of the proposed treatment, not the minor's competence. See James W. Ellis,
Some Observations on the Juvenile Commitment Cases: Reconceptualizing What
the Child has at Stake 31 LoY. L.A. L. REv. 929 (1998). But see N.M. STAT.
ANN. § 32A-6-14 (Michie 1995); James W. Ellis & Dorothy Kay Carter, Treating
Children Under the New Mexico Mental Health and Developmental Disabilities
Code, 10 N.M. L. REv. 279, 300-06 (1980) (discussing New Mexico statute that
gives certain minors the right to consent to or refuse medication).
24. See Rennie v. Klein, 462 F. Supp. 1131 (D.N.J. 1978), supp., 476 F. Supp.
1294 (D.N.J. 1979), modified, 653 F.2d 836 (3d Cir. 1981), vacated and remanded,
April 1998]
912 LOYOLA OF LOS ANGELES LAW REVIEW [Vol.31:907
decisions in those cases were not automatically extended to minors.2
Indeed, few commentators have even considered the issue of a com-
petent minor's right to give or withhold consent to medication.26
In the hypothetical situation where a minor has already been
found competent to make the abortion decision, what justifies deny-
ing the minor the same power to decide whether to take medication?
Although "competence" has different definitions, for the purposes of
this discussion assume a traditional definition of "informed consent."
The call of this question is whether a de facto competent minor has a
right to demonstrate-or attempt to demonstrate-the ability to sat-
isfy the applicable definition of "competence." Some have suggested
that the definition of "competence" should vary with the complexity
and seriousness of the decision involvedV and that assessment of a
minor's competence should extend beyond traditional cognitive
measures to consider a minor's "judgment.' 'u
One may argue that a minor competent enough to make the
abortion decision is likely competent to make a decision concerning
458 U.S. 1119 (1982), on remand, 720 F.2d 266 (3d Cir. 1983) (holding that an in-
voluntarily committed mental patient's right to privacy conferred the right to re-
fuse psychotropic medication); Rogers v. Commissioner of the Dep't of Mental
Health, 458 N.E.2d 308, 310 (Mass. 1983) (holding that under state law a commit-
ted mental patient is competent to make treatment decisions until adjudicated
incompetent by a judge). For an in-depth discussion of Rennie and Rogers, see
PFRLIN, supra note 3, at §§ 5.10-5.37.
25. See Riese v. St. Mary's Hosp. & Med. Ctr., 209 Cal. App. 3d 1303, 271
Cal. Rptr. 199 (1987) (establishing right of competent persons involuntarily
committed under short-term detention provisions of Lanterman-Petris-Short
(LPS) Act to refuse treatment), appeal granted, 751 P.2d 893, 245 Cal. Rptr. 627
(1988), appeal dismissed, 774 P.2d 698, 259 Cal. Rptr. 669 (1989). California sub-
sequently enacted legislation providing for capacity hearings to assess compe-
tency of persons asserting their right to refuse treatment under Riese. See CAL.
WELl. & INST. CODE §§ 5332-5336 (West 1994). Only a minority of counties ex-
tend the right to a capacity hearing to minors, even though the language of Riese
itself made no distinction between adults and minors, and the relevant sections of
LPS apply to both minors and adults. See id. §§ 5150-5250.
26. Two commentators have proposed model statutes. See Dennis E. Cichon,
Developing a Mental Health Code for Minors, 13 T.M. COOLEY L. REv. 529, 568-
613 (1996); Redding, supra note 20, at 752-54.
27. See Elyn R. Saks, Competency to Refuse Treatment, 69 N.C. L. Rav. 945,
992-98 (1991) (analyzing the "'different levels' thesis" of competency); see also
Rosato, supra note 6, at 62-73 (developing an operational definition of compe-
tency to refuse life-sustaining treatment).
2& See, e.g., Elizabeth S. Scott et al., Evaluating Adolescent Decision Making
in Legal Contexts, 19 LAw & HuM. BEHAV. 221, 237-38 (1995); Laurence Stein-
berg & Elizabeth Cauffman, Maturity of Judgment in Adolescence: Psychosocial
Factors in Adolescent Decision Making, 20 LAw & HuM. BEHAV. 249, 250
(1996).
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medications generally. Indeed, a minor competent to consent to
abortion, or to refuse it and consent to pregnancy-related care, is by
definition competent to make decisions concerning such medications
as may be prescribed in connection with abortion or pregnancy and
childbirth.
Should the competence standard for refusing mental health care
be higher than the standard for refusing abortion? 9 Are the abortion
decision and the medication decision different in complexity? Are
these decisions different in terms of the seriousness of the conse-
quences if the minor makes a "bad" choice?
The argument that minors should not have the right to consent to
psychotropic medication without parental approval is likely based
upon the seriousness of the consequences rather than the complexity
of the decision."° Psychoactive medications can indeed be very pow-
erful. They can also have serious side effects. A patient's response
to the medication requires close monitoring in many cases.3 Perhaps
for these reasons most state legislation does not authorize minors to
consent to psychotropic medication under existing medical emanci-
pation statutes.3 2 Yet these same concerns constitute powerful argu-
ments why de facto competent minors who want to refuse the medi-
cations should have the right to do so. In cases involving an adult's
29. See Trudi Kirk & Donald N. Bersoff, How Many Procedural Safeguards
Does It Take to Get a Psychiatrist to Leave the Lightbulb Unchanged? A Due
Process Analysis of the MacArthur Treatment Competence Study, 2 PSYCHOL.
PUB. POL'Y & L. 45, 52 (1996) (criticizing the MacArthur competence definition
as too high and as effectively demanding "higher levels of competency for mental
health treatment refusal than it does for medical health treatment refusal").
30. There does not seem to be any obvious reason why the risks and benefits
of medication are more difficult to grasp than those of abortion, and I have not
found a commentator making such an argument.
31. For a detailed description of the most commonly used psychotropic medi-
cations, their risks and benefits, and the discussion of medications by courts and
commentators, see WINICK, supra note 3, at 61-85.
32. Section 6924 of the California Family Code permits a minor age 12 or
older to consent to outpatient mental health counseling but explicitly does not
authorize the minor to consent to psychotropic medication. See CAL. FAM.
CODE § 6924(b)(f) (West 1994). Section 6922 of the California Family Code
permits a minor age 15 and older living apart from parent or guardian to consent
to general medical and dental care. See CAL. FAM. CODE § 6922(a) (West 1994).
General medical and dental care certainly includes prescribing medication; thus,
arguably under section 6922 a minor could consent to medication prescribed by a
general practitioner rather than a psychiatrist. For a more detailed discussion of
the confusion raised by such statutes, see Costello, supra note 6, at 492-95, or
generally Wadlington, supra note 6, at 323-24.
Ar-X-rl 998]
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right to refuse treatment,33 courts have consistently emphasized that
involuntary medication represents a substantial intrusion on an indi-
vidual's privacy right, citing the possibility of adverse side effects in-
cluding, in some cases, permanent, irreversible damage.3 However,
even without such side effects and even when the medications per-
form exactly as anticipated, courts have recognized that the medica-
tions affect the patient's thought content, moods, and even emo-
tions.35  Even when acknowledging the important benefits of
appropriate medication, courts have expressed these concerns in both
civil and criminal contexts. Further, one cannot assume the benefits
of involuntary medication for minors since many commentators have
suggested that inappropriate use of these medications in the treat-
ment of children and adolescents poses a significant problem.
3 6
Comparing the Abortion and Medication Decisions:
Three Criteria
The obvious counter-argument is that the abortion and medica-
tion decisions are not comparable. The abortion decision has three
special characteristics: It (1) has critical implications for the minor's
future; (2) is time-sensitive and cannot be postponed until the minor
reaches legal adulthood; and (3) is inextricably linked with an indi-
vidual's personal values.38 Courts have sometimes used these criteria
33. See, e.g., Riggins v. Nevada, 504 U.S. 127 (1992); Washington v. Harper,
494 U.S. 210 (1990); see also Rennie v. Klein, 720 F.2d 266 (3d Cir. 1983); Rogers
v. Okin, 478 F. Supp. 1342 (D. Mass. 1979), modified, 634 F.2d 650 (1st Cir.
1980), vacated and remanded sub noma. Mills v. Rogers, 457 U.S. 291 (1982), on
remand, 738 F.2d I (1st Cir. 1984).
34. See Rennie v. Klein, 462 F. Supp. 1131, 1137-38 (D.N.J. 1978); Rogers, 478
F. Supp. at 1359-60.
35. See Riggins, 504 U.S. at 137-38 (recognizing that prescribed medication
may adversely affect decision-making and could possibly have a prejudicial im-
pact on jury demeanor); Rogers, 478 F. Supp. at 1366-67 (noting that the ability
of medication to affect and change a patient's mood, attitude, and capacity to
think triggers First Amendment concerns).
36. See Peter R. Breggin, Q: Are Behavior Modifying Drugs Overprescribed
for America's Schoolchildren?, INSIGHT, Aug. 14, 1995, at 18; Lawrence H. Dil-
ler, The Run on Ritalin: Attention Deficit Disorder and Stimulant Treatment in
the 1990s, HASTINGS CENTER REP., Mar.-Apr. 1996, at 12; Kathi Grasso, Chil-
dren and Psychotropic Drugs: What's An Attorney to Do?, 16 ABA CHILD L.
PRAC. 49 (1997); Glen Pearson, Lessons Learned- Revisiting Medication for Kids,
16 ABA CHILD L. PRAc. 49 (1997).
37. See Bellotti, 443 U.S. at 642; Lungren, 16 Cal. 4th at 336, 940 P.2d at 815,
66 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 228.
3& See Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 850-51 (1991); Lungren,
16 Cal. 4th at 333, 940 P.2d at 813, 66 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 226.
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beyond the abortion context to uphold a mature minor's right to de-
cide even in cases where refusal of treatment will result in death.39
Does the decision to give or withhold consent to psychotropic
medication satisfy these criteria? First, will taking or refusing psy-
chotropic medication have critical implications for the minor's fu-
ture? Courts have consistently acknowledged that the stigma associ-
ated with being "mentally ill" or a "mental patient" can have serious
negative consequences in the future.! In the first hypothetical, if the
minor consents to taking Prozac and then subsequently tells, for ex-
ample, her friends, a college admissions officer, a future employer, or
even the state bar examiners, she may well experience such stigma.41
39. See In re E.G., 549 N.E.2d 322, 378 (1990) (upholding the right of a seven-
teen-year-old Jehovah's Witness to refuse life-sustaining treatment). The Illinois
Supreme Court based its ruling on the common law mature-minor doctrine and
found that because E.G. was competent to appreciate the consequences of her
decision, she was entitled to exercise her right to refuse treatment. See id. But
see O.G. v. Baum, 790 S.W.2d 839, 842 (Tex. Ct. App. 1990) (holding that six-
teen-year-old Jehovah's Witness had no right to refuse treatment since the juris-
diction had not adopted a mature-minor rule; the court did not reach a finding on
the minor's competence). See generally Rosato, supra note 6, at 40-49 (discussing
recent cases in which the court upheld the minor's decision to refuse life-
sustaining treatment); see also Jessica A. Penkower, Comment, The Potential
Right of Chronically Ill Adolescents to Refuse Life-Saving Medical Treatment-
Fatal Misuse of the Mature Minor Doctrine, 45 DEPAUL L. REv. 1165 (1996)
(analyzing the development of a minor's right to refuse treatment).
For some international perspectives on mature minors' decision making
in a variety of medical contexts, see Alistair Bissett-Johnson and Pamela Fergu-
son, Consent to Medical Treatment by Older Children in English & Scottish Law,
12 J. CONTEMP. HEALTH L. & POL'Y 449 (1996); Morag McDowell, Medical
Treatment and Children: Assessing the Scope of a Child's Capacity to Consent or
to Refuse to Consent in New Zealand, 5 J.L. & MED. 81 (1997); Adrian Sutton,
Authority, Autonomy, Responsibility and Authorisation: With Specific Reference
to Adolescent Mental Health Practice, 23 J. MED. ETHICS 26 (1997).
40. See Vitek v. Jones, 445 U.S. 480, 494 (1980) ("[T]he stigmatizing conse-
quences of a [prisoner's] transfer to a mental hospital for involuntary psychiatric
treatment... constitute the kind of deprivations of liberty that requires proce-
dural protections."); Addington v. Texas, 441 U.S. 418, 425-26 (1979) ("Whether
we label this phenomena 'stigma' or choose to call it something else ... we rec-
ognize that it can occur and that it can have a very significant impact on the indi-
vidual."); Conservatorship of Roulet v. Roulet, 23 Cal. 3d 219, 228-29, 590 P.2d 1,
7, 152 Cal. Rptr. 424, 431 (1979) (noting that stigma of mental illness can be as
"'socially debilitating as that of a criminal conviction"'); In re Roger S., 19 Cal.
3d 921, 929, 569 P.2d 1286, 1291, 141 Cal. Rptr. 298, 303 (1977) (stating that a mi-
nor has an "interest in not being improperly or unfairly stigmatized as mentally
ill or disordered").
41. And as Professor Susan Stefan's article shows, protection under the
Americans with Disabilities Act may not be an available or adequate remedy in
such instances. See Susan Stefan, "You'd Have to be Crazy to Work Here:"
Worker Stress, the Abusive Workplace, and Title I of the ADA, 31 LoY. L.A. L.
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Perhaps the stigma associated with taking psychotropic medications
has greatly lessened because of the popularity of antidepressants like
Prozac.42 But greater stigma can be associated with an antipsychotic
medication like Thorazine, which carries a popular connotation that
she must be "really crazy."
There is thus a danger of stigma if the minor decides to take the
psychoactive medication. However, a minor who refuses medication
may also suffer from stigma if his or her mental illness goes un-
treated. Chief Justice Burger in Parham opined that the untreated
symptoms of mental illness are also likely to stigmatize a minor.43 In
Addington he further stated that one who is suffering from untreated
mental illness is not really free." In both due process cases, the Court
considered the benefits of appropriate involuntary treatment in bal-
ancing the interests at stake.4 1 Yet the Court's reasoning only rein-
forces the point that the decision to accept or refuse medication holds
serious future consequences for a minor, thus satisfying the first cri-
terion.
The second criterion is easily satisfied: The medication decision
is time-sensitive and cannot be postponed until adulthood. If the de-
pressed minor in the first hypothetical is given the right to take medi-
cation without parental consent, she may perhaps postpone her deci-
sion. She is an outpatient and no third party is urging her to make an
immediate decision. But in the second hypothetical the hospitalized
minor faces an immediate decision because the staff member has
forced it upon him. However, in either case if the minor's mental
condition causes her or him great distress, that can be an important
internal source of pressure to decide immediately. If the minor's
mental condition deteriorates rapidly without medication, as a practi-
cal matter the minor cannot postpone the decision until adulthood.
Thus, depending upon the seriousness of the minor's mental condi-
tion, the decision to take or refuse medication may be postponed for
a short period of time-but certainly not until the minor reaches
adulthood.
REv. 795 (1998).
42. See PETER D. KRAMER, LISTENING TO PROZAC (1993).
43. See Parham v. J.1, 442 U.S. 584,601(1979) ("[W]hat is truly 'stigmatizing' is
the symptomatology of a mental or emotional illness .... The pattern of un-
treated, abnormal behavior--even if non-dangerous-arouses at least as much
negative reaction as treatment that becomes public knowledge.").
44. See Addington, 441 U.S. at 429 ("One who is suffering from a debilitating
mental illness and in need of treatment is neither wholly at liberty nor free of
stigma.").
45. See Parham, 442 U.S. at 600-06; Addington, 441 U.S. at 426-27.
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The third criterion is the most important: Is the decision inextri-
cably linked with the individual's personal values? This wonderful
language really goes to the heart of the right to refuse or consent to
treatment. No decision more closely involves an assessment of an
individual's own values than the one to accept mental health treat-
ment.
Identifying oneself as suffering from mental illness requires a
judgment about whether one's own thoughts and feelings are accept-
able or cause intolerable distress -whether one is "normal" or
"abnormal," "well" or "sick."'  This judgment may be difficult
enough even when the individual is deciding whether to seek rela-
tively less intrusive forms of mental health treatment, such as outpa-
tient talk therapy. However, taking medication necessarily implies
acceptance of the premise underlying its prescription-that the indi-
vidual has a mental illness or condition that is pathological and whose
symptoms the medication will alleviate. Indeed, mental health pro-
fessionals praise individuals who comply with medication directions
as showing insight into their condition. Conversely, individuals who
refuse medication because they deny their own mental illness are said
to lack insight."
Like adults, minors will vary in their readiness to accept a label
of pathology and in the symbolic importance they assign to taking
medication. Similarly, there will be great variation in response to and
tolerance of the changes in thought or mood brought about by psy-
chotropic medication.49 In some cases a minor may willingly ac-
46. The DSM-IV defines mental disorder as "a clinically significant behav-
ioral or psychological syndrome or pattern that occurs in an individual and that is
associated with present distress (e.g., a painful symptom) or with a significantly
increased risks of suffering death, pain, disability, or an important loss of free-
dom." AMERICAN PSYCHIATRIC ASSOCIATION, DIAGNOSTIC AND STATISTICAL
MANUAL OF MENTAL DISORDERS xxi (4th ed. 1994). Under this definition, a
person can be mentally ill even if not "in distress" if the mental disorder is caus-
ing problems in life, but the individual does not recognize mental illness as the
cause.
47. This of course reflects the powerful "borderline" metaphor used by Pro-
fessor Perlin. See Michael L. Perlin, "Where the Winds Hit Heavy on the Border-
line:" Mental Disability Law, Theory and Practice, "Us" and "Them", 31 LoY.
L.A. L. REv. 775 (1998).
48. This may be perfectly true both as to refusers generally and to an individ-
ual patient. The point is that accepting medication is regarded-by the treating
mental health professionals and parents as well as by the minor-as a sign that
the minor has accepted the premise that he or she is "sick" and in need of treat-
ment.
49. Reasons for refusing medication often include the denial of mental illness.
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knowledge mental illness and accept medication while his or her par-
ents reject mental health treatment as inconsistent with their per-
sonal values or religious beliefs. On the other hand, it is far from un-
common for parents to seek treatment of a minor, in part, because of
concern about behavior, sexual orientation, or opinions contrary to
the parents' moral or religious beliefs." In such cases the connection
between personal values and a minor's decision to accept or refuse
treatment is particularly strong. Thus, the decision to accept or ref-
use medication is inextricably linked with the minor's personal val-
ues, satisfying the third criterion.
Accordingly, because the medication decision and the abortion
decision share the same special criteria, the argument that they are
not comparable fails.
Extra Credit: How Is The Discussion Affected If The Two
Hypotheticals Take Place In California?
The California Constitution grants greater privacy and due process
rights to minors than are available to them under the federal Constitution.
But even persons who identify themselves as mentally ill may refuse a particular
medication-or all medications of a certain type-because when medicated, "I
just don't feel like myself." Unavoidable side effects of some medications can
impair intellectual acuity, physical coordination, or libido. See WINICK, supra
note 3, at 72-76. This is not unique to psychoactive medications-nor is the
problem of refusal or noncompliance.
50. The inappropriate use of the private mental health care system to confine
"out of control" children has been well documented for almost two decades. See,
e.g., MIKE A. MALES, SCAPEGOAT GENERATION 242-53 (1996) (critiquing un-
necessary hospitalization as "treatment of 'Kid-With-Insurance-Disorder'; IRA
M. SCHWARTZ, (IN)JUSTICE FOR JUVENILES: RETHINKING THE BEST INTERESTS
OF THE CHILD 131, 131-48 (1989) (characterizing unnecessary hospitalization as
"being abused at better prices"); Jan C. Costello & Nancy L. Worthington, In-
carcerating Status Offenders: Attempts to Circumvent the Juvenile Justice and
Delinquency Prevention Act, 16 HARV. C.R-C.L. L. REv. 41, 61-72 (1981)
(identifying inappropriate use of the mental health system to circumvent restric-
tions on juvenile court power to confine status offenders); Carol A.B. Warren &
Patricia Guttridge, Adolescent Psychiatric Hospitalization and Social Control, in
MENTAL HEALTH AND CRIMINAL JUSTICE 119, 119-22 (Linda A. Teplin ed.,
1984) (discussing inappropriate hospitalization of adolescents as a means of so-
cial control); Lois A. Weithom, Mental Hospitalization of Troublesome Youth:
An Analysis of Skyrocketing Admission Rates, 40 STAN. L. REV. 773, 831-34
(1988) (linking dramatic increase in hospitalization to inappropriate admissions
of "troublesome youth").
On the especially controversial use of such placements by parents hoping
to "cure" their lesbian or gay child, see Beth E. Molnar, Juveniles and Psychiatric
Institutionalization: Toward Better Due Process and Treatment Review in the
United States, 2 HEALTH & HUM. RTS. 99, 102-05 (1995).
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In two cases, American Academy of Pediatrics v. Lungren5" and In re
Roger S..' the California Supreme Court found unconstitutional two
statutory schemes-one regulating a minor's consent to abortion53
and the other regarding admission of a minor to a state mental hospi-
tal.' Both are comparable to those upheld by the United States Su-
preme Court under the federal Constitution.' In Lungren the court
found unduly burdensome, and hence unconstitutional, a statute that
required consent of both the minor56 and one parent before the minor
could receive an abortion, even though the statute provided a judicial
bypass. In Roger S. the court found that a fourteen-year-old minor
was entitled to an adversarial administrative hearing, including the
assistance of counsel, before he could be committed to a state mental
hospital even with parental consent.' Of the two precedents, Lun-
gren ironically is most immediately relevant to the issue of a de
facto" competent minor's privacy and due process right to refuse
medication for two reasons: the powerful way in which the majority
characterizes the privacy right of minors, and the parallels which Jus-
tice Mosk, dissenting, draws between the case before the court and
the issues presented in Roger S.
The California Supreme Court found that the explicit guarantee
of a privacy right in the California Constitution confers greater pro-
tection than does the United States Constitution." Since minors as
51. 16 Cal. 4th 307,940 P.2d 797,66 Cal. Rptr. 2d 210 (1997).
52. 19 Cal. 3d 921,569 P.2d 1286, 141 Cal. Rptr. 298 (1977).
53. Cf. Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833 (1992) (upholding Penn-
sylvania statute that required parental consent while providing a judicial bypass
procedure); Hodgson v. Minnesota, 497 U.S. 417 (1990) (holding that a Minne-
sota statute containing a two-parent notification requirement was constitutional
so long as it contains a judicial bypass).
54. Compare Parham v. J.R., 442 U.S. 584 (1979) (upholding as constitutional
a Georgia law permitting commitment of minors to state mental hospital on ap-
plication by parent and admission interview at hospital), with Roger S., 19 Cal. 3d
at 937, 569 P.2d at 1295-96, 141 Cal. Rptr. at 307-08 (holding that statute violated
minor's due process rights by not providing for a pre-admission hearing).
55. The Lungren majority opinion noted that the provisions of the challenged
statute, Assembly Bill 2274, "clearly were drafted to comply with the require-
ments set forth in the applicable federal decisions." Lungren, 16 Cal. 4th at 325,
940 P.2d at 807-08, 66 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 220-21.
56. This effectively gives the minor a veto power which the parent does not
possess under the statute.
57. See Roger S., 19 Cal. 3d at 931,569 P.2d at 1292, 141 Cal. Rptr. at 304.
58. The Court uses the terms "mature" and "immature" minors. For the
purposes of this discussion, "mature" and "de facto competent" minors are the
same.
59. See Lungren, 16 Cal. 4th at 325-26; 940 P.2d at 808, 66 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 221.
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well as adults are "persons" entitled to constitutional protection,
"there can be no question but that minors, as well as adults, possess a
constitutional right of privacy under the California Constitution. '
The court made a threshold determination that the challenged statute
implicated a protected privacy interest of minors,61 even though "the
only effect of the statute... is to condition the minor's exercise of his
or her constitutional privacy right upon parental consent. 62 The
court underscored the principle that the privacy right includes the
right to consent to or to refiuse to consent to medical treatment.63 "[I]f
a group or an individual... were to compel a pregnant minor to un-
dergo an abortion against her will, there would be no question but
that [this] ... would constitute a direct intrusion upon a constitu-
tionally protected autonomy privacy interest of the minor."
64 Al-
though acknowledging that parents traditionally make most health
care decisions for their children-exercising the privacy right on the
child's behalfo5 -the court reasoned that at least regarding the abor-
tion decision, a parental consent "statute denies a pregnant minor...
control over her own destiny" and represents a "most significant in-
trusion on the minor's protected privacy interest."'
The Lungren court next considered whether the state's asserted
interests justified such a significant intrusion and concluded that they
did not. 7 Applying a "compelling state interest" test,6" the court
found the statute unconstitutional. Acknowledging that protecting
the health and welfare of minors and enhancing the parent-child re-
lationship were indeed compelling state interests, the court found
that the parental consent requirement was not "necessary" to pro-
mote such interests.6'9 The majority cited at length to the trial court's
findings that most minors were capable of informed consent. In
view of the numerous statutes authorizing a minor to obtain other
60. Id. at 334, 940 P.2d at 814, 66 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 227.
61. See id. at 331-39, 940 P.2d at 812-18, 66 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 225-31.
62 Id. at 335, 940 P.2d at 815, 66 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 228.
63. See id. at 333, 940 P.2d at 814, 66 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 227.
64. Id. at 335, 940 P.2d at 814, 66 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 227.
65. See id. at 336, 940 P.2d at 815, 66 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 228.
66. Id. at 339,940 P.2d at 817-18,66 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 230-31.
67. See id. at 340, 940 P.2d at 818, 66 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 231.
6& See id. at 342, 940 P.2d at 819, 66 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 232 ("We conclude that,
under the California constitutional privacy clause, a statute that impinges upon
the fundamental autonomy privacy right of either a minor or an adult must be
evaluated under the demanding 'compelling interest' test.").
69. See id. at 352, 940 P.2d at 826, 66 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 239.
70. See id.
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types of medical care without parental consent, particularly preg-
nancy-related care,7' the majority concluded that a parental consent
requirement was unnecessary to protect the health of a pregnant mi-
nor. 2 Those "immature" minors who were incapable of informed
consent by definition could not receive an abortion without the con-
sent of their parents because both state law and medical ethics would
preclude a physician from performing the procedure. 3 As to the
"mature" or de facto competent minors, however, the parental con-
sent requirement imposed an undue burden.74
Remarkably, the court concluded that judicial bypass did not
save the statute's constitutionality.75 To the contrary, the court
viewed the judicial bypass not as a helpful procedure that enabled a
"mature" minor to demonstrate her competence, but rather as an un-
due burden on a minor's power to make the abortion decision.76 Re-
quiring de facto competent minors to use the judicial bypass "would
not serve-but rather would impede-the state's interest in protect-
ing the health of minors and enhancing the parent-child relation-
ship.
,,7
Thus in the abortion context, the Lungren court regarded it as an
unconstitutional burden to require a minor to prove that she is com-
petent to give or withhold informed consent. But in a mental health
care context, would the same court have even conceded that a
"mature" minor has a right to give or withhold consent to medica-
tion, much less a due process right to a hearing to demonstrate com-
71. See id.
[The power to consent to] medical care, without parental consent, for all
conditions relating to pregnancy... [permits] a minor who, for example,
develops life-threatening medical complications during her pregnancy to
make medical decisions relating both to her own health and to her fe-
tus's survival, without parental consent, in circumstances that may pose
much greater risks than generally are presented in undergoing an abor-
tion.
Id.
72- See id. at 355-56, 940 P.2d at 828-29, 66 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 241-42.
73. See id. at 355, 940 P.2d at 828, 66 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 241.
74. See id. at 354-59, 940 P.2d at 827-31, 66 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 240-44.
75. See id. at 356, 940 P.2d at 829, 66 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 242.
76. See id. The Court found:
[R]esort to this judicial procedure inevitably will delay the minor's ac-
cess to a medically safe abortion, thereby increasing the medical risks
posed by the abortion procedure, and will inflict emotional and psycho-
logical stress upon a minor without providing any greater protection of
the interests of either a mature or immature minor than what is pro-
vided by the minor's own health care provider.
Id.
77. d. at 356, 940 P.2d at 829, 66 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 242.
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petency? For all its powerful language about a minor's privacy rights
in the abortion context, the court hastened to distinguish more mun-
dane health care decisions by stating: "No one reasonably could sug-
gest that a serious state constitutional privacy question would be pre-
sented... whenever a parent, over a child's objection, requires the
child to go to the dentist or to take his or her medicine." 78 But what if
state action supported the parent's authority, and the medication was
administered not by a loving parent in the home, but by an employee
of a state mental hospital-or of a private mental hospital, where a
juvenile court, for instance, has placed the minor?79 Are not the pri-
vacy and due process issues very similar to those in the abortion con-
text? Would it not raise a state constitutional privacy question? At a
minimum, would not a "mature" minor have a right to exercise his or
her own due process rights in such a case?
Justice Mosk, dissenting in Lungren, did not answer these ques-
tions but drew important parallels between the abortion and mental
health contexts. s° He cited as closely analogous to the abortion cases
the precedent of In re Roger S.,8" which may be called California's
better version of Parham. It raised the question of what process is
due a fourteen-year-old minor whose parents wanted to place him in
a state mental institution. Citing significantly to the early abortion
cases,' the California Supreme Court found that a minor has a liberty
interest protected under both the federal and the state constitutions.3
Confinement to a mental hospital, which subjects the minor to invol-
untary treatment and imposes the stigma of mental illness, is a seri-
ous curtailment of that liberty interest, such that the minor is entitled
to due process protection.'
But unlike the United States Supreme Court in Parham, which
found that a traditional clinical admissions interview satisfied due
78. Id. at 336, 940 P.2d at 815, 66 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 228.
79. Under California law, a juvenile or dependency court can refer minors for
temporary mental health observation and evaluation; however, under the Lan-
terman-Petris-Short Act commitment proceedings must accompany any ex-
tended hospital confinement. See In re Michael E., 15 Cal. 3d 183, 538 P.2d 231,
123 Cal. Rptr. 103 (1975).
80. See Lungren, 16 Cal. 4th at 392-98, 940 P.2d at 853-57, 66 Cal. Rptr. 2d at
266-70 (Mosk, J., dissenting).
81. 19 Cal. 3d 921,569 P.2d 1286, 141 Cal. Rptr. 298 (1977).
82. See Lungren, 16 Cal. 4th at 393 n.7, 940 P.2d at 854 n.7, 66 Cal. Rptr. 2d at
267 n.7 (Mosk, J., dissenting).
83. See Roger S., 19 Cal. 3d at 927,569 P.2d at 1289, 141 Cal. Rptr. at 301.
84. See id. at 937,569 P.2d at 1296, 141 Cal. Rptr. at 308.
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process, 5 the California Supreme Court in Roger S. required more.
While recognizing that a minor's rights are not coextensive with an
adult's,"' the court stated that due process certainly entitles a minor to
an administrative hearing, assistance of counsel, and the opportunity
to present witnesses and cross-examine the case against him or her. '
Further, the hearing must occur before admission so that the minor
has better access to community services and witnesses closer to
home.'
The court, in giving Roger S. these protections, stated that at age
fourteen he was capable of exercising his own due process rights.89
Accordingly, his parents could not waive those rights on his behalf.
The distinction is important because even an extremely young child
has a liberty right which the state cannot abridge or deny without due
process. But traditionally, the parents exercised such due process
rights against the state on the child's behalf. Roger S. stands for the
important proposition that minors who can capably exercise their
own rights must be permitted to do so-parents cannot waive those
rights for them."
Indeed, Justice Mosk stated in Lungren:
From In re Roger S., we may derive the following principles.
First, an unemancipated minor's constitutional rights are
not equal to, but are more limited than, those of an adult,
both as against his or her parents and as against the state.
Second, an unemancipated minor has a right to procedures
that will protect him or her from arbitrary and drastic cur-
tailment of constitutional rights by his or her parents, or, pre-
sumably, the state, no manner [sic] how well motivated.
Third, a mature unemancipated minor, as opposed to one
who is immature, has an increased right to exercise her consti-
tutional rights, but even a mature unemancipated minor is
not entitled to all of the same procedural protections as an
85. See Parham v. J.R., 442 U.S. 584,607 (1979).
86. See Roger S., 19 Cal. 3d at 928,569 P.2d at 1290, 141 Cal. Rptr. at 302.
87. See id. at 937-38, 569 P.2d at 1296, 141 Cal. Rptr. at 308.
88. See id at 937, 569 P.2d at 1296, 141 Cal. Rptr. at 308.
89. See id at 931, 569 P.2d at 1292, 141 Cal. Rptr. at 304.
90. As the Lungren court noted, it is well established in the juvenile justice
context that a parent cannot waive a minor's Fourth, Fifth or Sixth Amendment
rights. See Lungren, 16 Cal. 4th at 336-37, 940 P.2d at 815-16, 66 Cal. Rptr. 2d at
228-29 (1997) (citing In re Scott K., 24 Cal. 3d 395, 595 P.2d 105, 155 Cal. Rptr.
671 (1979) (holding that parent may not waive a minor's right to be free from un-
reasonable search and seizure)).
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adult in the same situation.91
Justice Mosk then observed the similarities between abortion cases
and Roger S.: both involve a significant deprivation of liberty and a
minor's due process right to protection against "arbitrary and drastic
curtailment of constitutional rights by his or her parents, or the
state." In Roger S. a hearing to determine whether the minor met
the criteria for commitment provided that protection.' In the abor-
tion context, what would satisfy a mature minor's due process rights
under the state constitution? The answer is a judicial bypass-a
hearing to determine the minor's competence to make the abortion
decision. In Justice Mosk's view, the two situations contain striking
similarities and therefore should share similar results. The state
should recognize a minor's privacy and liberty right and provide a
fair procedure: in the abortion context, a judicial bypass, and in the
mental health context, a pre-admission administrative hearing.
Justice Mosk could not understand the majority's view that the
judicial bypass was burdensome and terrible when in Roger S. the
right to a hearing was a great thing. Justice Mosk argued that the ju-
dicial bypass, rather than restricting a minor's right, "facilitates the
ability of a mature unemancipated minor to obtain an abortion, re-
gardless of parental consent, if she so chooses."' He acknowledged
that minors who are competent to make the abortion decision have
the right to decide themselves. But he believed the state can require
the minor "to convince competent medical authorities that she has
the requisite understanding and maturity to give an informed consent
for any medical treatment."5 "[S]omeone must in every case make
the determination whether an individual unemancipated minor is ca-
pable of giving informed consent. ' 96
Of course, Justice Mosk did not argue for a minor's right to a
hearing to demonstrate his or her competency to refuse medication.
That issue was not before him. Rather, he used Roger S. and the
91. Lungren, 16 Cal. 4th at 394, 940 P.2d at 854, 66 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 267
(Mosk, J., dissenting) (emphasis added).
92. Id. (Mosk, J., dissenting).
93. See Roger S., 19 Cal. 3d at 937-39, 569 P.2d at 1295-97, 141 Cal. Rptr. at
307-09.
94. Lungren, 16 Cal. 4th at 398, 940 P.2d at 857, 66 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 270
(Mosk, J., dissenting).
95. Id- at 399, 940 P.2d at 858, 66 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 271 (Mosk, J., dissenting)
(quoting Ballard v. Anderson, 4 Cal. 3d 873, 883, 484 P.2d 1345, 1352, 95 Cal.
Rptr. 1, 8 (1971)).
96. Id. at 401, 940 P.2d at 859, 66 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 272 (Mosk, J., dissenting).
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analogy between involuntary hospitalization and abortion to argue
that the California statute was adequate. Unfortunately, Justice
Mosk alone made that connection. If the medication issue were be-
fore him today, would Justice Mosk carry the analogy to its logical
conclusion?
Probably not. Like the majority, Justice Mosk was wary of the
implications of recognizing a mature minor's rights to make other
health care decisions. The "unemancipated minor's disability of
nonage... [is based] on a fundamental social tenet that children re-
quire protection against their own immaturity and vulnerability in
making decisions that may have serious consequences for their health
and well-being." ' Although the state has chosen "to remove [that]
disability... in the so-called medical emancipation statutes ... [i]t is
not, however, constitutionally required to do so."98 "Certainly, a par-
ent can compel an obdurate six-year-old-or sixteen-year-old-to
submit to a tetanus vaccination." 99
Is receiving a tetanus shot the same as receiving antipsychotic
medication? Is parental authority to "compel" a minor limited to
threats of grounding the obdurate teenager, or can the parent use the
power of the state to hospitalize the teenager against his or her
wishes? Both the Lungren majority and Justice Mosk, in dissent,
seem worried that if these due process rights are extended beyond
the abortion context, obdurate children at home will be screaming,
"I'll go get a court order. Don't give me that cough medicine." Yet
it is easy to distinguish between, on the one hand, a mother adminis-
tering a spoonful of cod liver oil to a child in his own bedroom and,
on the other, the staff of a locked mental hospital ward physically re-
straining and injecting the minor with antipsychotic medication.
So, if a state agent involuntarily medicates a minor, with or with-
out parental consent,"° does that constitute "state action," thereby
97. Id. at 395, 940 P.2d at 855, 66 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 268 (Mosk, J., dissenting).
98. Id. at 396, 940 P.2d at 856, 66 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 269 (Mosk, J., dissenting).
99. Id (Mosk, J., dissenting).
100. The "state action" aspect of involuntary medication of a minor by a state
agent cannot be avoided by having the parent "consent." In both Parham and
Roger S., the United States and California Supreme Courts acknowledged that
confinement in a state mental hospital, even with parental consent, triggered the
Due Process clause. See Parham v. J.R., 442 U.S. 584, 599-601 (1979); In re
Roger S., 19 Cal. 3d 921, 929, 569 P.2d 1286, 1290, 141 Cal. Rptr. 298, 302 (1977).
Additionally, the constitutional guarantee of privacy in California protects
against wrongful action by both the state and private entities. Indeed, Lungren
found that "when the only effect of [state law] is to condition the minor's exercise
of his or her constitutional privacy right upon parental consent" the privacy and
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implicating the minor's privacy rights under the Federal and Califor-
nia Constitutions? Unquestionably, yes. Does that minor have a due
process right, under both constitutions, to demonstrate the compe-
tence to make the medication decision? Given the language from the
abortion cases, I do not see how the answer could be anything other
than yes.
True, the abortion cases typically include dicta to the effect that
even a competent minor does not have the right to make every health
care decision.'0 ' However, because the medication decision satisfies
the three criteria established in the abortion cases, it is not sufficient
for the state as parens patriae or a minor's parent to exercise the pri-
vacy right on the minor's behalf in all instances. A de facto compe-
tent minor who wishes to exercise the right is entitled to do so.
Therefore, despite Justice Mosk's assurances to the contrary,0' the
California legislature may well be constitutionally required to recog-
nize a de facto competent minor's right to make psychotropic medi-
cation decisions. It could do so either by a "medical emancipation"
statute authorizing minors to give informed consent to psychotropic
medications or by providing a judicial bypass procedure for individ-
ual minors to establish their competence."
Therapeutic Jurisprudence Issues
No discussion of the issues raised by the two hypotheticals would
be complete without at least a mention of therapeutic jurisprudence.
What are the therapeutic benefits and risks of giving a minor the
due process rights under the California constitution are triggered. Lungren, 16
Cal. 4th at 335, 940 P.2d at 815, 66 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 228. Justice Mosk's statement
of the principles derived from Roger S. includes a guarantee of a minor's right to
procedures that sufficiently protect against "arbitrary and drastic curtailment of
constitutional rights by his or her parents, or, presumably, the state, no [matter]
how well motivated." Id. at 394, 940 P.2d at 854, 66 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 267 (Mosk,
J., dissenting).
101. See, e.g., Bellotti v. Baird, 443 U.S. 622, 634-37 (1979); Lungren, 16 Cal.
4th at 336, 940 P.2d at 815, 66 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 228. Nor does a parent have a right
to make any and all health care decisions other than the abortion decision for a
minor. A state may restrict or prohibit the use of certain health care procedures
on minors, even with parental consent. See CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE § 5325(g)
(West 1988) (providing no psychosurgery for minor); CAL. PROB. CODE §
2356(d) (West Supp. 1998) (providing no sterilization for minor).
102. See Lungren, 16 Cal. 4th at 396, 940 P.2d at 856, 66 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 269
(Mosk, J., dissenting).
103. Despite the holding in Lungren that such a judicial bypass unnecessarily
burdened a minor's privacy rights in the abortion context, it would likely pass
constitutional muster in the mental health context so long as Roger S. remains
good law.
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right to demonstrate competence and, if found competent, to accept
or refuse medication? Do these risks and benefits differ from those
identified for adults? Is it possible to implement such a right so as to
assist a minor's mastery of the developmental tasks characteristic of
adolescence, such as separation of identity from parents? What are
the implications for family dynamics-can a de facto competent mi-
nor's rights be recognized without undermining family strength and
unity?
When assessing the individual minor's competency, are there
procedural alternatives to a traditional "adversarial" hearing which
are more therapeutic? Perhaps either a mediation model or giving
the mature minor the power to obtain a clinical "second opinion" to
assist in the decision better serves both the minor's and parents' in-
terests? TIME. I REALLY ENJOYED THE CLASS!
PROFESSOR'S GRADE AND COMMENT: B+
Clear statement of issues, good identification of relevant case
law and generally accurate-although in places oversimplified-
exposition of federal and state constitutional doctrine on privacy and
due process. Your application of the three criteria is fairly persua-
sive. However, you evaded the issue of a different definition of com-
petency for minors, relying instead on shifting the burden of proof to
the minor. And I would like to see you explore the interesting thera-
peutic jurisprudence issues you raised. Perhaps you'd like to do an
independent study on the topic? I'd be happy to supervise.
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